Failure at the Fed: A Study of the Determinants of Consumers\u27 Inflation Expectations by Mobilia, Luca
Skidmore College
Creative Matter
Economics Student Theses and Capstone Projects Economics
2017




Follow this and additional works at: https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/econ_studt_schol
Part of the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Creative Matter. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Student
Theses and Capstone Projects by an authorized administrator of Creative Matter. For more information, please contact jluo@skidmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mobilia, Luca, "Failure at the Fed: A Study of the Determinants of Consumers' Inflation Expectations" (2017). Economics Student
Theses and Capstone Projects. 28.
https://creativematter.skidmore.edu/econ_studt_schol/28
 Failure at the Fed: A Study of the Determinants of 





A Thesis Submitted to  
Department of Economics  
Skidmore College 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the B.A Degree 








 This paper utilizes data from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) to investigate the 
determinants of consumers' inflation expectations. I employ a series of OLS models to test the 
effect of various goods’ prices on consumers' inflation expectations, as measured by the 
Michigan Survey of Consumers, as well as the effects of monetary policy and previously 
observed inflation. My results indicate that energy prices have a positive statistically significant 
effect on consumers' inflation expectations, while previously observed inflation has no 
statistically significant effect. Furthermore, I find that adjustments to the federal funds rate and 
the recent implementation of inflation targeting do not appear to anchor consumers' inflation 
expectations. These findings suggest that the theory of rational expectations cannot be applied to 





 Managing inflation is one of the Federal Reserve's most important goals. This is done 
through control of the money supply and managing inflation expectations throughout the 
economy. But how should members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) quantify 
these expectations? For decades, the Federal Reserve and other central banks have relied upon an 
adaptive expectations model to quantify inflation expectations. But in recent years, organizations 
in a variety of countries have begun to survey economic agents of all sorts, quantifying these 
agents' inflation expectations. These agents range from professional inflation forecasters to the 
average consumer. The question is, whose inflation expectations should economists be 
measuring? Economists are typically interested in the expectations of firms, as they set the prices 
that drive inflation. Sadly, as there is no perfect dataset available for American firms' inflation 
expectations, economists must establish an adequate proxy for firms' expectations.  
 Economists Olivier Coibion and Yuriy Gorodnichenko argue that consumers' inflation 
expectations are the best proxy for firms’ inflation expectations. If we accept this argument, as I 
argue we can, we must endeavor to discover what drives consumers' inflation expectations. 
Rational expectations theory tells us that if consumers are rational actors, the Federal Reserve 
can use monetary policy to shape consumers' inflation expectations. Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
argue that consumers are not rational actors and therefore their expectations are unaffected by 
monetary policy. They suggest that consumers are rationally inattentive, which makes their 
expectations sensitive to the prices of frequently purchased goods.  
 My paper builds upon the literature in a number of ways. Firstly, it tests to see if 
previously observed inflation has a significant effect on inflation expectations when they are 
quantified with consumers’ inflation expectations as measured. Secondly, it explores the primary 
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determinants of consumers’ inflation expectations. Thirdly, it studies whether these effects 
remain significant when controlling for wage levels. Finally, it provides empirical results on the 
effects of monetary policy on consumers’ inflation expectations. I use an OLS model to test the 
effects of the index values of various CPI Stratums on consumers’ inflation expectations as 
measured by the Michigan Survey of Consumers in order to observe the effects of different 
prices on consumers' inflation expectations; my model also includes controls for monetary policy 
and wage. My paper makes two significant contributions to the literature. Firstly, it finds that 
consumers are rationally inattentive, as their behavior does not adhere to rational expectations 
theory. This is demonstrated by my duel findings that monetary policy is unable to anchor 
inflation expectations and the fact that consumers' expectations are unaffected by previously 
observed inflation. Secondly, it finds that the price of energy has a large significant effect on 
consumers' inflation expectations, with an average 3.14% increase in consumers' inflation 
expectations, supporting Coibion and Gorodnichenko's (2013) findings on the effect of oil prices 
on consumers' inflation expectations.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses background theory. 
Section 2 reviews the previous literature on inflation expectations. Section 3 discusses data and 
methodology. Section 4 outlines my empirical results. Section 5 outlines my findings. Section 6 
includes concluding remarks on policy implications and future research opportunities.     
Section 1: Background Theory 
 The Federal Reserve and other central banks rely on the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve, 
which is outlined below, to define inflation: 
𝜋" = 𝐸"%&𝜋 + 𝜃 𝑌" − 𝑌" + 𝜇" (1) 
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Where 𝜋" represents inflation in period t, 𝐸"%&𝜋 represents inflation expectations in period t-1, 𝜃 𝑌" − 𝑌"  represents the output gap in period t (often characterized by the difference between 
the unemployment rate and the natural rate of unemployment), and 𝜇" represents an exogenous 
supply shock. The Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve uses the following adaptive expectations model 
to define inflation expectations:  
𝐸",&𝜋 = 𝜋" (2) 
Where 𝐸",&𝜋 represents expected inflation in the next period, and 𝜋" is inflation in period t. This 
model conveys that economic agents expect inflation in the next period to be the same as 
inflation observed in the previous period. The adaptive expectations hypothesis was first put 
forth by Milton Friedman, who argued that inflation expectations can be determined by 
averaging inflation from the past four quarters (Mankiw 2012, 432-3).  
 In short, inflation is partially driven by inflation expectations, which are driven by 
previously observed inflation. The question that remains is, can the Federal Reserve affect 
inflation expectations? Rational expectations theory argues that it can. The theory states that 
economic agents optimally use all information that is available to them, including fiscal and 
monetary policy. Rational expectations theory states that any monetary policy must account for 
the effects it will have on inflation expectations. If this theory holds true, the Federal Reserve 
should be able to signal economic agents to shape their inflation expectations via changes in 
monetary policy (Mankiw 2012, 415). 
Section 2: Literature Review 
This literature review is broken down into four sections. Section 2A discusses the 
traditional measurement of inflation expectations given the assumption of adaptive or rational 
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expectations, as well as the implications these models have on determining the effectiveness of 
monetary policy. Section 2B establishes the validity of the recent use of survey data for 
quantifying inflation expectations based on recent papers which find that the inclusion of survey 
data increases the forecasting accuracy of Neo-Keynesian economic models. Section 2C 
discusses the implications of using data from surveys of consumers as opposed to surveys of 
forecasters when determining the effectiveness of monetary policy. Section 2D discusses this 
paper’s original contributions to the literature.  
Section 2A: Adaptive and Rational Expectations 
Friedman (1968) outlines what he believes monetary policy can and cannot do. His paper 
is quite extensive, and discusses a broad range of monetary policy topics. As this paper’s focus is 
inflation expectations, this review of Friedman (1968) will focus solely on his opinions on the 
effects of adaptive expectations. The importance of adaptive expectations is discussed in his 
section outlining the limits of Keynesian monetary policy. Friedman argues that adaptive 
expectations prevent central banks from accomplishing two of their primary policy goals: 
pegging interest rates and the unemployment rate. Friedman believes that the predominant 
Keynesian economic theory is wrong and that monetary policy can only accomplish these goals 
in the short run.  
 Friedman begins by critiquing the Keynesian view that central banks can peg interest 
rates. The traditional Keynesian logic, as Friedman understands it, is as follows: if banks want to 
keep interest rates down, they will make large open market purchases of treasury securities. This 
raises the securities’ price, lowers their yield, and increases the quantity of money in the 
economy, pushing interest rates down. But Friedman says this decrease in interest rates is only 
temporary. He argues that an increase in the money supply will lead to higher incomes, which 
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will inflate prices. Due to adaptive expectations, the public will expect prices to continue to rise. 
This means that borrowers will be more willing to pay higher interest rates. Friedman argues that 
the short term decrease in interest rates will actually be followed by an increase to an interest rate 
that is greater than the one before the open market purchase was conducted. That being said, 
interest rates will eventually return to the level they otherwise would have maintained. Because 
of this, Friedman argues that it is impossible for central banks to keep interest rates low in the 
long run. 
 At the time Friedman wrote this essay, mainstream economists still relied upon the 
original Phillips Curve, which shows a simple inverse relationship between unemployment and 
inflation. However, Friedman argues that monetary policy can only temporarily lower 
unemployment. This is due to the combination of adaptive expectations and the natural rate of 
unemployment. He assumes that the economy starts at the natural rate of unemployment, with a 
stable inflation rate. Workers and employers have written their contracts, and have adjusted their 
wages in pace with observed inflation. The central bank then implements a policy of monetary 
growth, increasing aggregate demand, which in turn leads to an increase in prices greater than in 
previous periods. Firms, now making more money, hire more workers, and the unemployment 
rate dips. However, since inflation was greater than anticipated, workers’ nominal wages have 
risen but their real wages have fallen. Since workers only care about their purchasing power, 
they will negotiate for higher wages, which will result in firms laying off the new workers that 
they had just hired, and unemployment rises back to its natural rate. This reasoning leads 
Friedman to argue that central banks are incapable of lowering unemployment in the long run.   
 As demonstrated in Section 1, mainstream economists incorporated Friedman’s theories 
into the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve. That being said, not all economists consider this model 
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to be valid. Farmer (2013) discounts the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve. He lists a variety of 
concerns, but his main problem with the model is its reliance on Friedman’s natural rate 
hypothesis. He argues that central bankers relying on this model believe that there is no way to 
curb persistently high unemployment, as they believe this unemployment to be the result of 
structural changes that cannot be affected by monetary policy. Farmer (2013) believes that 
equilibrium in the labor market can be reached at any unemployment rate via the matching of 
workers and firms using modified search theory; standard search theory uses a Cobb-Douglas 
function where employment is a factor of the number of people looking for work and the number 
of vacancies firms are looking to fill, with the assumption that firms will produce enough goods 
to meet aggregate demand in the economy. He argues that once aggregate demand is determined, 
profit maximization will dictate the equilibrium level of unemployment. He closes his model 
with the following equation: 
𝐸" 𝜋",& + 𝐸" 𝑌",& − 𝑌" = 𝜋" + 𝑦" − 𝑌"%& + 𝑧"/ (3) 
Where 𝐸" 𝜋",&  represents expected inflation, 𝐸" 𝑌",& − 𝑌"  represents expected GDP growth, 𝜋" represents inflation in the current period, 𝑦" − 𝑌"%&  represents GDP growth, and 𝑧"/ 
representss a belief shock. This equation states that expected inflation and GDP growth are 
determined by observed inflation and GDP growth, as well as irrational changes in expectations, 
which Farmer equates to Keynes’ concept of the ‘animal spirits.’ These expectations translate 
into actual economic growth through the optimized IS curve. In this way, expectations become 
self-fulfilling prophecies.  
 Farmer (2013) characterizes his model as an adapted rational expectations model which 
allows for monetary policy to shape inflation expectations. Farmer (2012) examines the ways in 
which conventional and unconventional monetary policy can affect inflation expectations. He 
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begins by outlining the arc of monetary policy from 1960 through 2011. He argues that up until 
1979, the Federal Reserve allowed the federal funds rate to be relatively insensitive to variation 
in the inflation rate. This resulted in a broad range of inflation rates.  However, after 1979, the 
Federal Reserve increased the federal funds rate’s sensitivity to variation in inflation. This 
reigned in inflation to a narrow range of lower values. This also had the effect of curbing 
inflation expectations, as market participants knew that inflation would be curtailed much more 
aggressively than in the past. The issue that arose during the Great Recession, when the Federal 
Reserve dropped interest rates to zero, was that the FOMC had no way of signaling future policy 
changes using conventional monetary policy. Farmer (2012) argues that the Federal Reserve 
circumvented this problem by employing Quantitative Easing. His argument is based on trends in 
one year expected inflation in the swaps market. These expectations dropped during the 
recession, but quickly recovered. This recovery after the Great Recession corresponded with the 
Federal Reserve’s purchase of mortgage-backed securities and other types of securities. Farmer 
(2012) believes that the purchasing and corresponding stabilizing of the prices of these long-term 
assets reinforced medium and long term inflation expectations and prevented disinflation. 
Section 2B: The Introduction of Survey Data into Neo-Keynesian Models 
While rational expectations models are still relied upon, economists have recently started 
to use survey data to test their models. Two such economists are Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
(2013), who set out to answer the same question as Farmer (2012): why didn’t the United States’ 
economy experience disinflation after the Great Recession? The Phillips Curve tells us that the 
massive increases in unemployment during the Great Recession should have led to similarly 
massive disinflation. In reality, inflation was more or less constant before, during, and 
immediately after the Great Recession. Explanations for this so-called missing disinflation 
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included increases in the natural rate of unemployment, shifts in marginal costs characterized by 
a lack of wage disinflation, or the flattening of the Phillips Curve. But upon delving into these 
explanations, Coibion and Gorodnichenko find that each of them is unable to explain the data. 
They instead put forth the hypothesis that an increase in inflation expectations can explain this 
missing disinflation.  
  Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) believe that Friedman’s measure of adaptive 
expectations would not be a sufficient measure of inflation expectations, as the Neo-Keynesian 
Phillips Curve forecasted disinflation. This required Coibion and Gorodnichenko to find a more 
accurate measure of inflation expectations. They argue that since firms are the price setters in the 
economy, a survey of firms’ inflation expectations would have been ideal. However, since no 
such survey exists in the United States, Coibion and Gorodnichenko needed to find an 
appropriate proxy for firms’ inflation expectations. They theorize two possible proxies; the 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC). The 
SPF is considered a good proxy because large firms are likely to have a professional forecaster 
on staff or hire a forecasting firm. However, they theorize that small to medium sized firms 
would be unlikely to receive considerable gains from precise information about aggregate 
conditions in the economy and would instead track idiosyncratic factors within their own 
industry due to rational inattention. This review will make a brief digression to outline the theory 
behind rational inattention.  
Sims (2003) is widely credited as the originator of the theory of rational inattention. He 
argues that the rational expectation theory’s assumption that all agents employ perfect 
forecasting based on expectations formed via an analysis of aggregate economic information is 
incorrect. He argues that many agents have constraints on their ability to gather information, 
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which forces them to rely on incomplete sources of information. This leaves agents vulnerable to 
idiosyncratic shocks to their beliefs. He compares these agents to a casual reader of the New York 
Times. The Times publishes the federal funds rate every day in the back of the business section, 
but not all readers have the time or agency to obtain this information. Thusly, it will be a shock 
to the casual reader if one day the Times publishes a bolded headline declaring that the Federal 
Reserve has pushed forward an increase to the federal funds rate. In the same way that there 
would be no shocks if all readers read the Times in its entirety, there would be no shocks if there 
were no constraints on economic agents’ ability to gather information. 
 The effects of these constraints worsen if one assumes a variable inflation rate, and that 
all firms seek to maximize their profits. If the variance of the inflation rate is low, the marginal 
return of accurately tracking the inflation rate is low. This will lead agents to allocate more 
resources to take in more aggregate economic information. However, if variance of inflation rate 
is high, then the marginal return of accurately predicting the inflation rate increases. This will 
lead agents to allocate more of their resources towards tracking their specific inflation rate at the 
expense of searching for other economic information. He argues that this is why there is an 
increase of inflation-indexation clauses when the inflation rate becomes variable, as well as why 
economic efficiency decreases in the presence of variable inflation.  
The theory of rational inattention is what leads Coibion and Gordonichenko (2013) to 
suggest that the MSC would serve as a better proxy for firm expectations, as the average 
consumer is also not likely to track aggregate conditions in the economy. To determine which 
survey is a better proxy, Coibion and Gorodnichenko develop a nested Phillips Curve that 
includes both the SPF and the MSC as dependent variables, predicting that if the MSC is the 
better proxy it will be significant and SPF will not. Their model proves this to be the case. But 
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what drives consumer inflation expectations? Coibion and Gorodnichenko theorize that oil and 
commodity prices increase consumers’ inflation expectations. They test this by running the 
following regressions:  
𝐸"012𝜋",&,",4𝐸"156𝜋",&,",4 = 𝛽8 + 	𝛽𝑂𝑖𝑙𝑃" + 𝛽𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝑔𝑟𝑜" + 𝜀" (4) 
𝐸"012𝜋",&,",4𝐸"156𝜋",&,",4 = 𝛽8 + 𝛽	log HIJ5KHIJ5KLM + 𝛽	𝑙𝑜𝑔 5NIOPQRNSK5NIOPQRNSKLM + 𝜀" (5) 
Where 𝐸"012𝜋",&,",4𝐸"156𝜋",&,",4 represents the difference between the MSC and the SPF’s 
expected inflation over the coming year, OilP represents the real price of oil, as taken from West 
Texas Intermediate, PriceAgro represents the food index price produced by the World Bank, and β	log HIJ5KHIJ5KLM /𝛽	𝑙𝑜𝑔 5NIOPQRNSK5NIOPQRNSKLM  represents these prices’ respective growth rates. These 
regressions show that the difference between household and professional inflation expectations 
can be explained by consumers’ increased sensitivity to changes in the price of oil and food, with 
consumers being particularly sensitive to changes in oil price. They run an additional regression, 
using just the MSC, in order to test this: 
𝐸"I𝜋",",&V − 𝐸"%WI 𝜋"%W,",W = 𝛽8 + β	log HIJ5KHIJ5KLX 𝑥100 + 𝜀" (7) 
Where 𝐸"I𝜋",",&V−𝐸"%WI 𝜋"%W,",W represnts the difference between inflation expectations when 
t=12 and inflation expectations when t=6; this is done to eliminate potential individual fixed 
effects, as the MSC cycles to survey the same people every six months. β	log HIJ5KHIJ5KLM 𝑥100 
represents the percent change in the price of oil. Coibion and Gorodnichenko find that for every 
1% increase in the real price of oil, there is a 1.6% increase in consumers’ inflation expectations. 
They theorize that this effect is transmuted through gas prices, which consumers are exposed to 
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every day. Their findings suggest that increases in oil prices that occurred during the Great 
Recession led to increased inflation expectations that offset disinflation. This is based on their 
belief that consumer inflation expectations are the best proxy for firm inflation expectations, as 
consumers’ expectations best capture small to medium size firms’ rational inattention.  
Łyziak (2016) also tests to see if survey data of inflation expectations can be used to 
improve the forecasting accuracy of Neo-Keynesian economic models. All of his data comes 
from the Polish Central Statistical Office (GUS)'s survey of inflation expectations from 2001-
2014. This survey is significant because it measures the inflation expectations of firms, financial 
analysts, and consumers. Łyziak (2016) introduces these expectations in the open market IS 
Curve and the Neo-Keynesian Phillips Curve. He defines each group’s inflation expectations 
with the following equation: 
𝜋",",4P = 𝜏𝜋"%& + 1 − 𝜏 𝜋",4 + 𝜀"]^(8) 
Where 𝜋",",4P  represents that particular group’s inflation expectations, 𝜏 is a factor that represents 
the number of economic agents who use solely backwards-looking expectations, and 1 − 𝜏 𝜋",4 represents the amount of expectations defined by rational forward-looking 
expectations. He then runs counterfactuals to see if using these survey results of inflation 
expectations improved Neo-Keynesian models’ accuracy. He makes two significant 
observations. The first is that survey measures of inflation expectations, particularly those results 
taken from firms, improved the accuracy of Neo-Keynesian models. This is in line with 
traditional economic theory, which tells us that firms are price-setters. The second observation is 
that firms’ inflation expectations are more similar to those of professional forecasters, not to 
those of consumers. This puts Łyziak (2016) at odds with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013). 
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While he uses data from Poland, Łyziak (2016) does cite a working paper which reports that firm 
expectations are closer to forecasters’ expectations using data from a survey of businesses 
conducted by the Federal Reserve of Atlanta. This suggests that his conclusion can be applied to 
data from the United States. Unfortunately, the sample only has three years’ worth of data and is 
from a limited number of states; in comparison, the MSC uses data from 48 states and has been 
conducted for decades. This difference suggests that Łyziak’s (2016) conclusions are not 
necessarily applicable to the United States.  
Section 2C: Survey Data’s Implications for Monetary Policy 
 While quantifying inflation expectations is important, monetary policymakers’ goal is 
ultimately to manage these expectations in order to prevent economic crisis. Gaballo (2016) 
argues that theoretically forward guidance can have a significant effect on private inflation 
expectations. He defines private inflation expectations as a factor of the current price level, 
forward guidance from the Federal Reserve, and an error term representing further private 
information. He argues that forward guidance’s effect is tempered by variable K. K can range 
anywhere from 0, implying that forward guidance has no effect, to ∞, implying that all 
information is perfectly conveyed from the Federal Reserve to the private entities. K’s value 
greatly tempers how much forward guidance affects private inflation expectations. If K’s value is 
high, then forward guidance will largely drive private inflation expectations, whereas market 
prices and private sources of information will not. Conversely, if K is low, private inflation 
expectations will be driven either by market prices or private information. If private expectations 
are determined largely by monetary policy this would imply rational expectations, whereas if 
private expectations are determined largely by private information then it would imply rational 
inattention. While this paper lays out extensive theoretical work, it does not provide empirical 
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evidence. However, it does raise an important question on the strength of the transmission 
mechanism. Rational expectations theory tells us that the transmission mechanism is strong, but 
can economists use survey data to support this hypothesis? I find that there is a difference of 
opinion amongst those authors who quantify inflation expectations using surveys of professional 
forecasters and those who quantify inflation expectations using surveys of consumers. 
 Tsenova (2012) argues that long term inflation expectations are well anchored by 
monetary policy. He uses survey data of professional forecasters from both the Eurozone and the 
United States. The survey from the Eurozone asks about expected inflation for the Harmonized 
Index of Consumer Prices (HCIP), while the SPF in the United States asks about expected 
inflation in CPI. In order to standardize the sample of years, as the United States survey started 
in 1994 while the Eurozone survey started in 1999, the sample is restricted from 1999 to 2009. 
Using this dataset, he constructs the following three-equation model: 
∆𝜋I,"P	JS`R = 𝛽∆]∆𝜋" + ∆𝜖I,"∆]    (9) 
∆𝜋I,"P	JS`R = 𝛽∆]bPc/1∆𝜋"PbPc/1 	+ ∆𝜖I,"]^d^efg (10) 
∆𝜋I,"P	JS`R = 𝛽∆]bPc/0∆𝜋"PbPc/1 	+ ∆𝜖I,"]^d^efh(11) 
Where ∆𝜋I,"P	JS`R represents changes in long term inflation expectations, ∆𝜋" represents current 
change in inflation, ∆𝜋"PbPc/1 represents changes in short term news, and ∆𝜋"PbPc/1 represents 
changes in medium term news. Changes due to short term news are defined by forecasts of 
inflation 1 to 4 quarters in the future; he theorizes that this would capture the effect of short term 
shocks in the economy. Changes due to medium term news are defined by forecasts of inflation 5 
to 8 quarters in the future, as he believes this capture changes due to announced monetary policy. 
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He finds that long term inflation expectations in the Eurozone are insensitive in all three 
equations, making them perfectly anchored. Expectations in the United States are slightly less 
well-anchored. Long term inflation expectations are sensitive to current inflation and short term 
news at the 1% level, and sensitive to medium term news at the 5% level; despite this, neither of 
these coefficients are particularly high. These results show that American forecasters' 
expectations are more sensitive to current inflation and shocks as compared to their European 
counterparts, but are ultimately anchored by monetary policy.  
Coibion et al (2015), who use the MSC to quantify inflation expectations, come to a 
different conclusion. They argue that inflation expectations are not anchored by forward 
guidance. Their argument hinges upon five points. The first is that consumer inflation 
expectations, as measured by the MSC, hover between 3.1% and 4.4%. These values are 
considerably higher than the Federal Reserve’s stated goal of 2% inflation; in comparison, 
professional forecasters’ expectations are closer to the Federal Reserve’s target. The second 
point is that variability of expectations is high amongst consumers. While the dispersion amongst 
professional forecasters is 0.4%, the dispersion amongst consumers is 4%. The third point is that 
consumers are highly uncertain of their inflation expectations. The Survey of Consumer 
Expectations asks respondents to assign a probability to 10 inflation baskets; the mean standard 
deviation is 3 percentage points, showing a high degree of uncertainty. The fourth point is the 
high level of revision for inflation forecasts. Between 70 and 80% of MSC respondents revise 
their forecast, with an average revision of 5%. The fifth point is that consumers’ long run 
inflation expectations are highly sensitive to their short run inflation expectations.  
 Coibion et al (2015) attribute this failure to anchor inflation expectations largely to a lack 
of knowledge of monetary policy. As a crude proxy for knowledge of monetary policy they cite a 
16	
	
survey which finds that only 25% of those asked could identify Janet Yellen as the chair of the 
Federal Reserve. They also noted that the entire Federal Reserve System only has a total of 
702,955 Twitter followers, which is far fewer followers than a pop star or even an economist 
such as Paul Krugman. By analyzing Google Trends data, they find that people are 3 to 4 times 
as likely to search for “puppies” than they are to search for “inflation” or even “unemployment.” 
While consumers didn’t appear to know much about monetary policy, an Opinion Research 
Corporation finds that 68% of respondents rated inflation as extremely important to them. This 
led Coibion et al (2015) to hypothesize that this lack of knowledge of monetary policy came 
from consumers’ inability to understand it. They cite an Associated Press poll which finds that 
70% of respondents said monetary policy is “difficult to understand” and 25% said it is “very 
hard to understand.” This lack of understanding leads to an inability on the part of the Federal 
Reserve to anchor inflation expectations. 
 As outlined above, Coibion et al (2015) argue that consumer inflation expectations are 
highly variable. One must turn to micro-level data to understand why. Kaplan and Schulhofer-
Wohl (2016) find that there is large heterogeneity amongst household inflation rates. They draw 
this conclusion using data from the Kilts-Nielson Consumer Panel (KNCP), a dataset that uses 
barcodes to determine the specific goods consumers purchased as well as the price they paid and 
quantity they purchased; this data is collected from over 500 million purchases made by 50,000 
U.S. households over the course of a decade. Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2016) measure 
inflation using the Laspeyres, Paasche, and Fisher indexes, and make a number of alterations to 
isolate various effects. Their first alteration is to replace individual unit price with the average 
price for that item across households. This is done to isolate the effect of the contents of a 
household’s specific basket from the price of those items. Their second alteration is to replace 
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unit price with the average price of goods within its stratum, the category that the item would fall 
under in the aggregate CPI, in order to observe the inflation of different categories of goods. 
Their third alteration is to assign prices from the aggregate CPI to each household’s basket to see 
if they can recreate the aggregate CPI used in macroeconomic data. All four indexes produce a 
wide distribution of inflation rates that are clustered around the aggregate inflation rate in the 
economy. This implies that all households are not subject to the same inflation rate, as most 
macroeconomic models would suggest. Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2016) theorize that 
heterogeneity of inflation rates would not necessarily lead to heterogeneity of inflation 
expectations. But they argue that since most households would not have a method of finding 
where they lie on the distribution of inflation rate, they would use the aggregate inflation rate as 
a proxy for their individual inflation rate. However, Coibion et al (2015)’s work contradicts this 
theory, as they find that consumers have a broad distribution of inflation expectations that are 
consistently higher than the target set by the Federal Reserve. This is also in line with Sims’ 
(2003) original work, which stated agents would rely less on aggregate data when presented with 
highly variable inflation.  
Section 2D: Original Contributions  
 As stated before, central banks generally rely on adaptive expectations and rational 
expectations models to quantify inflation expectations. This reliance is perfectly valid, as 
Friedman and Farmer’s works show that these models provide a significant level of forecasting 
accuracy. That being said, Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2013) work, as well as Łyziak‘s 
(2016) work, shows us that economists can use survey measures of inflation expectations to 
improve economic model’s forecasting accuracy. The question that arises is, what survey should 
be used to quantify inflation expectations? As Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) acknowledge, 
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a survey of firms’ inflation expectations would be best. Unfortunately, this data does not exist for 
the United States. Until the time when such a survey exists, economists must select an adequate 
proxy. This leads to economists to choose between the MSC and the SPF as a proxy.  
 The one obvious difference between the MSC and the SPF is the population surveyed. 
The MSC is distributed to 500 random households from the continuous United States, while the 
SPF is distributed to 42 professional forecasters from the same geographic area. Another 
difference between the surveys is the time frame over which they are collected. The MSC 
surveys households at a monthly rate, while the SPF surveys professional forecasters at a 
quarterly rate. Despite these key differences, the surveys have a near identical measure of 
inflation expectations; both surveys take the median expected 1-year inflation rate from the 
surveyed group. These methods are more or less identical to the measures used in the European 
surveys outlined in section’s 2B and 2C. The one exception is the SPF conducted by the 
European Central Bank, which publishes the mean expected inflation rate.  
 I opt to use MSC as my measure of inflation expectations. I base this on Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s (2013) empirical model which finds that the MSC has a statistically significant 
effect on inflation when included in the Phillips Curve alongside the SPF. While Łyziak’s (2016) 
use of Polish survey data finds that professional forecasters’ inflation expectations are closer to 
firms’ inflation expectations, I am not convinced by his argument that these results are applicable 
to the United States. While he cites a working paper that produces preliminary results from a 
survey of American producers’ inflation expectations, I feel that the small sample size of years 
and states makes it impossible to argue that the MSC is not currently a better proxy.  
 With this in mind, I build upon Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2013) work on the 
determinants of consumers’ inflation expectations. I make a number of significant changes to 
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their model based on what I view to be flaws in their methodology. Firstly, I test to see if 
previously observed inflation has a significant effect on consumers’ inflation expectations. While 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) rightfully argue that Phillips Curves which employ 
Friedman’s original adaptive expectations model do not have same the forecasting accuracy as 
Phillips Curves that rely on survey data, they do not consider that adaptive expectations 
assumptions should be tested using said survey data. For this purpose, I test to see if the average 
inflation rate from the past four quarters, the measure Friedman uses to quantify inflation 
expectations, has a significant effect on consumers’ inflation expectations. This idea is partially 
drawn from Tsenova (2012) and Łyziak (2016), who use observed current inflation as a 
determinant of survey-measured inflation expectations.  
 Secondly, while Coibion et al (2015) make a compelling argument that forward guidance 
fails to anchor consumers’ inflation expectations, it does not rest on any sort of empirical model. 
With this in mind, I include two controls for monetary policy in my model. The first measure is 
the effective federal funds rate, which I use to capture the effects of conventional monetary 
policy on consumers’ inflation expectations. The second measure is forward guidance, which I 
quantitatively define as the difference between observed PCE inflation and the Federal Reserve’s 
target of 2%.  I employ these controls in order to observe if there is an empirical basis for 
Coibion et al’s (2015) assertions about the Federal Reserve’s inability to anchor consumers’ 
inflation expectations. It will also allow me to broadly determine if consumers are rational 
economic actors as defined by rational expectations theory. 
 Thirdly, I believe Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) omit wage from their model. This 
belief is partially based on Friedman’s argument that workers are primarily concerned with their 
purchasing power. This leads me to include real wages, which can stagnate, as an important 
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control in my model. I also include nominal wages as a control, in case consumers prove to be 
more affected by the dollar value of their wages. While this inclusion is not supported by 
Friedman’s theory, it is still possible that the dollar value of wages will have an effect on 
consumers’ inflation expectations. 
 I make the above adjustments in order to correct the omissions in Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s (2013) model. My final original contribution is to establish which prices 
consumers are most sensitive to. Drawing on Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl’s (2016) study, I use 
different index values of various CPI stratums as my dependent variable. This includes the index 
for food, energy, and rent. In a similar vein, I also use values from the housing index and the 
PCE for healthcare. I use these variables because I believe that the values of these goods 
represent prominent expenditures made by all consumers.  
Section 3: Data and Methodology 
 This section is broken into three parts. Section 3A outlines data sources, specifications, 
and aggregation methods. Section 3B provides summary statistics. Section 3C outlines my base 
model and its various re-specifications. 
Section 3A: Data  
 I use data from the Michigan Survey of Consumers (MSC) to track consumer inflation 
expectations. The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan distributes the MSC to 
500 random households from the contiguous United States, and follows up with respondents six 
month later, which allows analysts to track individual fixed effects. They report inflation 
expectations as the median expected price change in the next 12 months. I take MSC data from 
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).  
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 In order to test Friedman’s theory of adaptive expectations, it is necessary to choose how 
I want to quantify inflation. While the Federal Reserve uses the percent change in Personal 
Consumption Expenditures (PCE) as their measure of inflation, I use the percent change in CPI. I 
base this choice on Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2013) assumption that this would be the 
measure of inflation that consumers would be most sensitive to. This data is collected by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and can be taken directly from their website.  
 As stated before, my work is heavily based upon Coibion and Gorodnichenko’s (2013). 
They find that changes in oil prices, as transmitted through gasoline prices, have a statistically 
significant effect on consumers’ inflation expectations. My research’s goal is to see if whether 
the price of major expenditures such as food, energy, healthcare, and housing also have a 
significant effect on consumers' inflation expectations. This presents a problem when selecting 
variables for my model. Coibion and Gorodnichenko track oil prices because of their effect on 
the price of gasoline, a good that is more or less homogenous. But when tracking changes in the 
price of food, energy, and healthcare, categories that include a broad range of goods and 
services, it is difficult to decide upon a single price to track. I attempt to solve this problem by 
instead using the index values of various stratums of CPI and PCE, with the theory that I would 
be able to track aggregate trends in these sectors. With this in mind, I use the following variables 
from FRED: The CPI for all Urban Consumers: Food and Beverages, the CPI for all Urban 
Consumers: Energy, and the CPI for all Urban Consumers: Rent of Primary Residence. All of 
these CPI stratums use an index of 1982-1984=100. Changes in the price of health care are 
tracked through Personal Consumption Expenditures: Services: Health Care, which uses an index 
of 2009=100. As an alternative measure of the price of housing I also included the House Price 
Index for the United States, which uses an index of 1980Q1=100.  
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 My model employs a number of controls, starting with controls for monetary policy. I use 
two different measures of monetary policy. The first measure is the effective federal funds rate, 
which can be found on FRED. The second measure is inflation targeting. I measure inflation 
targeting by recording the difference between observed PCE inflation, based on FRED’s dataset 
Real Personal Consumption Expenditures, and the Federal Reserve’s 2% inflation target. The 
second type of control is wage. I employ two separate measures of wage, both of which are taken 
from FRED. The first is Average Hourly Earnings of Production and Nonsupervisory 
Employees: Total Private. The second is the Median Usual Weekly Real Earnings: Wage and 
salary workers: 16 years and over, which uses 1982-84 CPI adjusted dollars. These two variables 
are meant to control for nominal and real wages respectively.  
 The majority of data listed above is collected on a monthly basis. However, the House 
Price Index and PCE data are collected on a quarterly basis. For the purpose of standardizing 
time periods, I convert all data into quarterly data; this is done by calculating the variables’ 
average value throughout the quarter. Furthermore, my dataset begins in the first quarter of 1980 
and ends in the last quarter of 2015. I use these years due to restrictions on the years in which 
data is available for certain variables; 1980 is the earliest year for which data from the MSC is 
available on FRED, and 2015 is the latest year for which data from the House Price Index is 
available on FRED. By setting these years as the first and last years for my sample, I assure that 
all variables have 144 observations.  
 Finally, I generate a series of variables capturing changes the values of my 
various dependent variables, which I refer to as difference variables. These difference variables 
are meant to capture the effect of changes in prices, wages, or monetary policy on consumers’ 
inflation expectations. These difference variables are specified as the value of variable x in 
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period t minus the variable x’s value in period t-2. This is based on the fact that the MSC follows 
up with the same sample of consumers every 6 months; as my data is in quarters, this would be 
every two periods. Furthermore, the difference variables are defined as xt – xt-2, as opposed to 
using a percentage change like Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) did, due to my use of index 
values as opposed to a specific price such as oil. The way indexes such as the CPI work is as 
follows: one year, or group of years serves, as the base year and is given a value of 100. The 
majority of the indexes employed in this paper use 1982-84 as their index. If, to provide a 
hypothetical example, the index value for one of these indexes is 101 in 1985, it does not mean 
the average cost of food has risen by one CPI adjusted dollar. It means that prices have risen by 
1% of prices in those base years. Ergo, due to what index values represent, it does not make 
sense to track the percentage change in their value.   
Section 3B: Summary Statistics 
 This section outlines my summary statistics. The summary statistics for my base 
variables are in Table 1. The summary statistics for my difference variables are in Table 2. All 
variables have 144 observations.    
Table 1: Summary Statistics for Base Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th Q 50th Q 75th Q Min Max 
mich 3.41 1.34 2.8 3.1 3.4 1.1 10.2 
dif 2.7 1.24 2.8 3.1 3.4 .76 7.85 
ai .77 .49 .47 .72 .95 -.39 3.02 
rate 5.03 4.07 1.43 5.20 7.04 .07 17.78 
food 162 47 121 159 198 83.6 247 
energy 140.68 55.2 100.78 109.9 247.2 81.83 264.61 
health 69.66 26.69 45.42 70.92 93.11 22.1 110.07 
house 229.3 88.86 155.47 205.15 318.88 100 378.21 
rent 177.95 58.69 130.3 169.28 230.32 78.33 290.31 
nom 13.41 4.26 9.63 12.77 17.07 6.63 21.22 




 Table 1 reveals a great deal about consumers’ inflation expectations. Based on the 
average value of mich, consumers do not appear to have unreasonably high inflation 
expectations. However, the fact that mich’s max value comes from 1990, a year with low 
observed inflation, shows the potential that consumers expect inflation to be considerably higher 
than it is the following year. This hypothesis suggests a simple test. The variable dif captures the 
difference between the level of inflation consumers expected in the coming year and the average 
observed percent change in CPI over that following year. The average value of dif is 2.7, 
meaning that on average consumers expected inflation to be 2.7% higher than actual observed 
inflation the following year. The fact that dif has a maximum value of 7.85 shows that 
consumers’ inflation expectations can be markedly higher than actual inflation. 
 Writing this paper in 2017, it is hard to remember a time when the federal funds target 
was not close to zero. The summary statistics for rate remind us that this has not always been the 
case. The average value of rate is 5.03, which shows that in the 35 years this sample is drawn 
from, the Federal Reserve has relied on more contractionary monetary policy relative to the 
norms of today. By calculating rate’s interquartile range, which is 5.61, we can see that the 
middle 50% of rates fall within a broad range. This demonstrates the level of specificity that the 
Federal Reserve uses while conducting monetary policy.   
 When analyzing these summary statistics, it is important to remember that these variables 
use index values as opposed to dollar amounts. This means that the average value of food, 162, 
indicates that on average food prices are 62% higher than they were in the base period. With this 
in mind, house and rent have had the highest average price increase since their base year, 
followed by food then energy. The low average value of health, 69.66, is due to the fact that it 
uses 2009 as its index. As the majority of data is collected from before 2009, it would make 
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sense that the average index value is below 100. Unsurprisingly, the maximum values of all of 
these variables are grouped amongst recent years. 
 The average value of nom is 13.41, meaning that the average hourly wage from 1980 
through 2015 is $13.41. That being said, this average does not really tell us anything, as nominal 
wages generally trend upwards. This is demonstrated by the max value of 21.22 coming from the 
sample’s last quarter. The results in Table 2 support this. They show that all values of nomdif are 
positive, which confirms that nominal wages always trend upwards. The average value is 0.2, 
which only amounts to an increase of about 20 cents, but that is unsurprising as hourly wages 
generally do not increase per quarter. In comparison, real wages can fluctuate, so the average 
value of realdif tells us more than the average value of nomdif. The average value of realdif is 
positive, which shows that real wages generally increase from quarter to quarter. That being said, 
the fact that the value of the 25th quartile is -2 shows that real wages can and do depreciate. 
While on average these changes in purchasing power are small, the min and max show that under 
certain circumstances they can be quite drastic.   
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Difference Variables 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th Q 50th Q 75th Q Min Max 
michdif .09 0.67 -.2 .004 .2 -.17 2.7 
ratedif -0.19 1.34 -0.57 -.01 0.26 -5.22 6.73 
fooddif 2.29 1.32 1.43 2.06 2.8 -1.31 7.5 
energydif 1.63 12.92 -1.98 1.76 6.9 -84.34 34.61 
heatlhdif 1.23 0.43 0.89 1.23 1.47 -0.57 2.21 
housedif 3.7 6.31 1.7 3.71 6.67 -20.51 20.9 
rentdif 2.95 1.1 2.23 2.9 3.63 -.09 6.02 
nomdif 0.2 0.06 .14 .2 .24 .06 .36 
realdif .34 3.39 -2 0 2 -7 14 
 
 The summary statistics for michdif show that on average inflation expectations generally 
rise between periods, but only by a small amount, with infrequent expected deflation. The 
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summary statistics for fooddif, energydif, and healthdif, show that on average the costs of food, 
energy, and healthcare grow at a moderate rate. The average changes in the price of housing, as 
measured by housedif and rentdif, are higher. The average values of all of these variables show 
that these prices tend to trend upward, with generally only small dips as demonstrated by their 
minimums. The two exceptions to this are energydif and housedif, which have minimums with 
extremely negative values. These values both come from periods during the Great Recession, 
which is the most severe economic downturn to occur within the sample; taking this into 
account, these minimums are not surprising. This is particularly true for housedif’s minimum, as 
it was the precipitous fall in housing values that led to the economic crash. Furthermore, 
energydif’s high standard deviation shows the price of energy are generally volatile and is 
subject do large jumps and dips.   
 One of my paper's goals is to see how inflation targeting effects consumers' inflation 
expectations. However, the Federal Reserve only formally implemented inflation targeting in 
January of 2012. Because of this, the variables target and targetdif only have 16 observations, as 
opposed to 144. The summary statistics for target and targetdif are outlined in Table 3.  
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Inflation Targeting 
 Mean Std. Dev. 25th  50th  75th  Min Max 
target .35 1.13 -0.5 .35 1.15 -1.3 2.6 
targetdif .13 1.18 -0.6 .15 0.8 -1.7 2.6 
 
 When viewing these summary statistics, remember that the variable target is defined as 
the difference between the percentage change in the PCE in the past quarter and the Federal 
Reserve’s inflation target of 2%. This means that on average, PCE inflation is 0.35% higher than 
the Federal Reserve’s target of 2%. This does not mean that inflation is consistently above target, 
as demonstrated that 25% of quarters saw inflation below target. This makes sense, as lackluster 
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inflation is what led the Federal Reserve to keep the federal funds rate down in recent years. The 
mean value of targetdif indicates that on average the difference between observed PCE inflation 
and the 2% target rises by 0.13% during a quarter. This would mean that if PCE inflation is 
below target, it would move closer to target, and if it is above target it would be even higher.  
Section 3C: Methodology  
 This paper’s first goal is to establish whether the adaptive expectations hypothesis holds 
true when consumer inflation expectations, as measured via the MSC, are used to quantify 
inflation expectations. For this purpose, I use the following regression: 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑎𝜋" + 𝜀" (12) 
Where mich represents the average expected yearly inflation for that quarter, and aπ represents 
the average inflation rate from the previous four quarters. I created aπ based upon the measure of 
inflation expectations Friedman used in his expectations-adapted Phillips Curve. If the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis applies when measuring consumers’ inflation expectations, the 
coefficient for aπ should be positive and statistically significant.  
 This paper’s second goal is to see which prices have the most significant effect on 
consumers’ inflation expectations. I use the following regression to capture these effects 
measuring concurrent responses to price levels: 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒" + 𝜀" (12) 
Where mich again represents the average expected yearly inflation for that quarter, good 
represents the average value of the respective index from the past quarter, and rate represents the 
average effective federal funds rate for that quarter. I use the variable good in this section as a 
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stand in for the various index values used in my study. If consumers’ expectations are sensitive 
to the value of any of these goods and services, I should find that the various good variables 
should be statistically significant and positive; this prediction is based upon Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko’s (2013) finding that price levels have a positive effect on consumers’ inflation 
expectations. The variable rate is included as a control for monetary policy. Theory tells us that 
increases in the federal funds rate are meant to curb inflation. An informed rational actor would 
expect lower inflation as interest rates go up. If this dynamic holds true for consumers, then 
rate’s coefficient would be statistically significant and negative.  
 While Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) find that consumers’ inflation expectations are 
affected by the price of oil, they find that these expectations are more sensitive to the changes in 
these prices. I use first difference model outlined below to capture these effects: 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝜀" (13) 
The variable michdif represents the difference between the mich's value in period t and its value 
in period t-2. The variable gooddif represents difference between the value of variable good in 
period t and its value in period t-2. The variable ratedif represents the difference between the 
value of variable rate in period t and its value in period t-2. If consumers’ inflation expectations 
are sensitive to changes in the prices of various goods like they are to oil prices, we would expect 
gooddif’s coefficient to be statistically significant and positive. If consumers’ inflation 
expectations are sensitive to changes in monetary policy, and consumers are rational actors, we 
would expect ratedif’s coefficient to be statistically significant and negative.   
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 My paper’s third goal is to see the effect of the value of wages on consumers’ inflation 
expectations. With this in mind, I introduce nominal wages into equations 2 and 3 to produce the 
following two regressions: 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒" + 𝛽o𝑛𝑜𝑚" + 𝜀" (14) 𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽o𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝜀" (15) 
Where all variables included in previous regressions have the same value, nom represents the 
average hourly earnings of production and non-supervisory employees that quarter, and nomdif 
represents the difference between the value of variable nom in period t and its values in period t-
2. These variables are included to see if the effects of various prices and their changes are still 
statistically significant when controlling for nominal wage. I also theorize that nom and nomdif 
will have statistically significant positive values, as I believe consumers’ inflation expectations 
will rise if they see the dollar value of their wages rise. However, Friedman argues that workers 
only care about their real wage. I use the following two regressions to test this: 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒" + 𝛽o𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙" + 𝜀" (16) 𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽V𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽o𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝜀" (17) 
Where all variables included in previous regressions have the same value, real represents the 
average median weekly earnings for full-time workers, and realdif represents the difference 
between the value of variable real in period t and its value in period t-2. These variables are 
included to see the effects of various prices and their changes are still significant when 
controlling for purchasing power. I theorize that real and realdif will have statistically significant 




This paper’s fourth goal is to see if monetary policy has any effect on consumers’ inflation 
expectations. The base model uses the federal funds rate as its measure of monetary policy, but I 
desire to see if inflation targeting, which is explicitly intended to shape expectations, affects 
consumers’ inflation expectations. I use my final two regressions to capture these effects:  
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑" + 𝛽V𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡" + 𝜀" (18) 
𝑚𝑖𝑐ℎ𝑑𝑖𝑓" = 𝛽8 + 𝛽&𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝛽V𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑓" + 𝜀" (19) 
Where all variables included in previous regressions have the same value, target represents the 
difference between the average inflation of PCE in the past quarter the Federal Reserve’s 
inflation target of 2%, and targetdif represents the difference between the value of variable target 
in period t and its value in period t-2. The theory of rational expectations tells us that, if 
consumers are rational informed actors and know that as inflation approaches two percent the 
Federal Reserve is more likely to attempt to curb inflation, target and targetdif should both have 
a statistically significant negative value. The variables target and targetdif replace the variables 
rate and ratedif respectively, as they are alternative measures of monetary policy. Unfortunately, 
due to the fact that the Federal Reserve only announced its 2% inflation target in January of 
2012, these regressions will only rely on a sample of 3 years, reducing the number of 
observations to 16.  
Section 4: Empirical Results 
 This section is broken down into 4 subsections. Section 4A discusses my application of 
adaptive expectations to consumers' inflation expectations. Section 4B outlines the results of my 
base model and its various re-specifications. Section 4C outlines the results of my various first 
difference models. Section 4D discusses my implementation of robustness checks. 
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Section 4A: Adaptive Expectations 
 I begin my regressions by testing the adaptive expectations hypothesis. The results are 
outlined in Table 4. Variable aπ’s coefficient turned out to be statistically significant. Its value 
indicates that for every 1% increase in the average inflation rate over the past year, consumers’ 
inflation expectations increase by 1.41%. This indicates that there is some validity to applying 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis to consumers’ inflation expectations, as increases in 
observed inflation lead to increases in inflation expectations. While Friedman theorizes that 
economic agents expect inflation to be the same as previously observed inflation, these results 
show that consumers expect inflation to be higher. This suggests that better explanations can still 
be found.  










Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Section 4B: Base Model 
The regression results in Table 5 show that all the variables have a statistically significant 
effect on consumers’ inflation expectations at the 1% level. The coefficients’ values are small, 
but when considering the scale of these variables’ values, this is understandable. To demonstrate 
this, one can simply multiply a variable’s coefficient by its average value. This produces values 
of 2.43 for food, 2.12 for rent, 1.68 for energy, 1.65 for health, and 1.14 for house. These results 
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show that the average value of these variables increase consumers’ inflation expectations by 
around 1½ to 2 ½%, with the price of food having the greatest effect on average. It is important 
to note that the average value of health is low due to the index year being 2009. This could 
suggest that the cost of healthcare has had a greater effect on consumers’ inflation expectation in 
recent years, possibility due to its prominence in the political landscape.  
Table 5: Base Model 
Mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Food 0.0159***     
 (0.00332)     
Rate 0.371*** 0.331*** 0.355*** 0.306*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0534) (0.0425) (0.0566) (0.0479) (0.0543) 
Energy  0.0127***    
  (0.00167)    
Health   0.0247***   
   (0.00686)   
House    0.00547***  
    (0.00147)  
Rent     0.0121*** 
     (0.00282) 
Constant -1.040 -0.0389 -0.0930 0.616 -0.583 
 (0.753) (0.385) (0.710) (0.509) (0.721) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.497 0.561 0.470 0.467 0.487 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Interestingly, rate generally has a statistically significant positive effect. The theory 
rational expectations tells us that if the federal funds rate is higher, a rational actor will expect 
inflation to drop, but my base regression’s results instead suggest that consumers’ expectations 
are not tempered by monetary policy in this way. These results raise the question of whether rate 
would have the expected negative effect when not controlling for any of the good variables. With 
this in mind, I run a regression with mich as the dependent variable and rate as the sole 
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independent variables. Table 6’s results show that even without controlling for good variables, 
rate still has a statistically significant positive effect. There are a number of possible reasons as 
to why this could be. One is that rate is capturing an effect from some omitted variable, which is 
causing the unexpected sign. This would mean that rate’s value is the result of misspecifications 
in the model. Another possible explanation is that if consumers are aware of the federal funds 
rate, they do not understand its effect on the economy. This could lead them to believe that an 
increase in interest rates means higher inflation, not lower. This explanation would mean rate’s 
value is a result of policy illiteracy. That being said, my base model measures concurrent 
responses, so there is also the possibility that the federal funds rate might have a lagged effect on 
consumers’ inflation expectations.  










Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Another of my paper’s goals is to see whether the effects these prices have on consumers’ 
inflation expectations remain when controls for wage are implemented. The results of my base 
regression with variable nom added as a control are displayed in Table 7. With the inclusion of 
nominal wages, only energy continues to have a statistically significant positive effect on 
consumers’ inflation expectations. The coefficients for health and rent, while statistically 
significant, are negative. The coefficients for house and food are not statistically significant when 
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controlling for nominal wages. As predicted, nom generally has a statistically significant positive 
effect. Next, I wanted to see if these dynamics remain when controlling for real wage as opposed 
to nominal wage. The results of these controls are outlined in Table 8. 
Table 7: Base Model, Nominal Wage Control 
Mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Food 0.00609     
 (0.0179)     
Nom 0.105 -0.115 0.388*** 0.226*** 0.885** 
 (0.184) (0.0700) (0.101) (0.0578) (0.349) 
Rate 0.367*** 0.280*** 0.319*** 0.368*** 0.309*** 
 (0.0529) (0.0538) (0.0548) (0.0532) (0.0521) 
Energy  0.0183***    
  (0.00330)    
Health   -0.0413**   
   (0.0199)   
House    -0.00262  
    (0.00210)  
Rent     -0.0554** 
     (0.0274) 
Constant -0.842 0.968 -0.533 -0.870 -0.164 
 (0.862) (0.800) (0.714) (0.700) (0.744) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.498 0.570 0.513 0.500 0.519 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8’s results show that even with real implemented as a control, all of the good 
variables have a statistically significant positive effect at the 1% level. This shows that 
consumers’ inflation expectations are still affected by price levels when controlling for their 
purchasing power, as opposed to the dollar value of their wages. Despite these results, the 





Table 8: Base Model, Real Wage Control 
Mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Food 0.0149***     
 (0.00347)     
Real 0.00684 0.00336 0.0141 0.00758 0.00498 
 (0.0105) (0.00911) (0.0106) (0.0122) (0.0115) 
rate 0.374*** 0.334*** 0.360*** 0.309*** 0.364*** 
 (0.0553) (0.0493) (0.0583) (0.0502) (0.0548) 
energy  0.0124***    
  (0.00153)    
health   0.0212***   
   (0.00729)   
house    0.00484***  
    (0.00175)  
rent     0.0115*** 
     (0.00321) 
Constant -3.122 -1.119 -4.495 -1.731 -2.089 
 (3.435) (3.139) (3.488) (3.891) (3.623) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.498 0.561 0.476 0.468 0.488 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Another of my paper's goals is to see if these effects remain when inflation targeting is 
used to measure monetary policy. Table 9's results suggest that inflation targeting does not have 
a statistically significant effect on consumers' inflation expectations. Furthermore, target's 
inclusion leads to a statistically significant negative effect for my other variables. That being 
said, it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these results due to the drastic 




Table 9: Base Model, Inflation Targeting Control  
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
food -0.0440***    
 (0.00644)    
energy 0.0101***    
 (0.00124)    
target -0.0282 0.0597 0.0554 0.0514 
 (0.0280) (0.0485) (0.0481) (0.0435) 
health  -0.158***   
  (0.0238)   
house   -0.0118***  
   (0.00186)  
rent    -0.0224*** 
    (0.00311) 
Constant 0.711** 20.19*** 6.964*** 9.148*** 
 (0.270) (2.567) (0.626) (0.854) 
     
Observations 16 16 16 16 
R-squared 0.751 0.617 0.705 0.730 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Section 4C: First Difference Model 
The next question is whether, as Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) suggest, consumers’ 
inflation expectations are affected more by changes in prices rather than price levels themselves. 
In order to test this, I convert my base model into a first difference model. The results are 
displayed in Table 10. Only the coefficients for fooddif and energydif are statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the coefficients are not particularly high. On average, the change in the price of 
food only leads to a .31% increase in consumers' inflation expectations, while the average change 
in the price of energy .01% increase in consumers' inflation expectations. These results suggest 
that bi-annual price changes do not have a profound effect on consumers’ inflation expectations. 
Changes in the federal funds rate do not appear to have a statistically significant effect on 
consumers' inflation expectations.   
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Table 10: First Difference Model 
michdif (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
fooddif 0.137**     
 (0.0629)     
ratedif -0.00918 -0.0223 -0.00374 0.0117 0.00487 
 (0.0740) (0.0806) (0.0797) (0.0777) (0.0773) 
energydif  0.0127**    
  (0.00516)    
healthdif   0.0623   
   (0.105)   
housedif    -0.0205  
    (0.0133)  
rentdif     0.0909 
     (0.0557) 
Constant -0.229* 0.0636 0.0119 0.166* -0.174 
 (0.126) (0.0531) (0.121) (0.0879) (0.144) 
      
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.074 0.059 0.002 0.036 0.021 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Similar to my base model, I include changes in nominal and real wages as controls in my 
First Difference Model. Table 11’s results show that when controlling for changes in nominal 
wage, changes in price levels largely do not have a statistically significant effect on changes in 
consumers' inflation expectations; the one exception is energydif, which again has a small 
coefficient. The coefficient for nomdif is generally statistically significant and positive. However, 
even when using the largest coefficient for nomdif, the average change in nominal wages will 
only lead to a .46% increase in consumers' inflation expectations. So while consumers are 





Table 11: First Difference Model, Nominal Wage Control 
michdif (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
fooddif 0.0195     
 (0.0252)     
nomdif 0.176 1.956** 2.306** 2.108** 2.014* 
 (0.501) (0.946) (1.098) (0.969) (1.088) 
ratedif 0.00705 -0.0292 -0.0135 0.000635 -0.0103 
 (0.0232) (0.0754) (0.0736) (0.0726) (0.0747) 
energydif  0.0113**    
  (0.00433)    
healthdif   0.0925   
   (0.111)   
housedif    -0.0185  
    (0.0119)  
rentdif     0.0342 
     (0.0544) 
Constant -0.0741 -0.332* -0.496* -0.271* -0.421* 
 (0.103) (0.172) (0.260) (0.158) (0.220) 
      
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.009 0.096 0.054 0.080 0.053 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 12’s results show that when controlling for changes in real wages, only fooddif and 
energydif are statistically signficant, with both of their coefficients being positive; again, these 
coefficients are small and on average do not lead to a large increase in consumers' inflation 
expectations. The coefficient for realdif is negative and statistically significant. These results are 
in line with the hypothesis that as consumers’ purchasing power rises, they will expect less 
inflation. Despite this, the coefficient for realdif is extremely low, meaning the overall change in 







Table 12: First Difference Model, Real Wage Control 
michdif (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
fooddif 0.121*     
 (0.0626)     
realdif -0.0347** -0.0240 -0.0460*** -0.0409*** -0.0499*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0191) (0.0164) (0.0147) (0.0168) 
ratedif -0.0324 -0.0341 -0.0374 -0.0180 -0.0267 
 (0.0756) (0.0801) (0.0819) (0.0781) (0.0760) 
energydif  0.00929    
  (0.00618)    
healthdif   -0.0428   
   (0.102)   
housedif    -0.0183  
    (0.0125)  
rentdif     0.114* 
     (0.0589) 
Constant -0.184 0.0746 0.150 0.165* -0.233 
 (0.129) (0.0561) (0.126) (0.0860) (0.151) 
      
Observations 140 140 140 140 140 
R-squared 0.101 0.068 0.047 0.075 0.078 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 Lastly, I include inflation targeting as an alternative measure of monetary policy. The 
variable targetdif represents the change from the previous period's PCE inflation's difference 
from the Federal Reserve's 2% target and current PCE inflation's difference from this target. 
Table 13 shows that changes in this difference do not have a statistically significant effect on 
changes in consumers' inflation expectations. Though as with the inclusion of target in my base 
model, it is difficult to reach any definitive conclusions based on the drastic reduction in sample 







Table 13: First Difference Model, Inflation Targeting Control 
michdif (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
fooddif 0.0467     
 (0.0454)     
targetdif -0.0463 -0.0271 -0.0395 -0.0658 -0.0330 
 (0.0641) (0.0650) (0.0550) (0.0795) (0.104) 
energydif  -0.0108    
  (0.00664)    
healthdif   -0.305   
   (0.197)   
housedif    0.0232  
    (0.0295)  
rentdif     -0.00399 
     (0.120) 
Constant -0.174 -0.0934 0.141 -0.226 -0.0570 
 (0.156) (0.0751) (0.126) (0.240) (0.443) 
      
Observations 10 10 10 10 10 
R-squared 0.103 0.253 0.205 0.109 0.037 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Section 4D: Robustness Checks 
 My regressions suggest that consumers' concurrent responses to price levels are stronger 
than their responses to price changes. However, these regressions do not capture whether 
previously observed prices or implemented monetary policy help to anchor consumers' inflation 
expectations. For this purpose, I take the step of creating goodlag variables, defined as the value 
of good with a single lag, to my base model. Table 14's results show that when controlling for 
previously observed price levels, only food, energy, and house prices are statistically significant; 
that being said, the fact that the coefficients for the lagged values of food and energy are 
negative, means that while price levels in the current period raise expectations, these 
expectations lower based on previously observed prices. This means that the net effect of current 
prices is lower than what my base regression found. Let's assume, for the sake of simplifying this 
example, that food has the same value in period t and period t-1; this is not too great an 
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assumption, as my summary statistics show that food's value does not change a great deal from 
period to period. This would mean that the average value of food leads to a 71% increase 
consumers' inflation expectations, and the average value of foodlag would lead to a 69% 
decrease in consumers' inflation expectations; this leads to a net increase in consumers' inflation 
expectations, which is around .4% lower than the average effect observed when not controlling 
for previously observed prices. Using this same methodology, the net change in consumers' 
inflation expectations based on the value of energy would be a 1.68% increase, which is the same 
as the effect observed by my base model. When controlling for previously observed prices, 
house's coefficient is negative, but the value of houselag is positive, which leads to an average 
net effect of a 1.18% increase in consumers' inflation expectations, which is slightly higher than 
the average effect observed in the base model. Finally, while one might expect that the lagged 
value of rate would have a negative effect on consumers' inflation expectations, it has the 
previously observed positive effect. This supports the conclusion that consumers' expectations 










Table 14: Base Model, Lagged Variables Included 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food 0.441***     
 (0.132)     
foodlag -0.430***     
 (0.133)     
rate 0.241 0.253 0.265 0.265 0.273 
 (0.228) (0.250) (0.267) (0.255) (0.266) 
ratelag1 0.0619 0.0469 0.0649 0.0159 0.0771 
 (0.219) (0.240) (0.257) (0.250) (0.266) 
energy  0.0274***    
  (0.00832)    
energylag  -0.0158*    
  (0.00838)    
health   0.304   
   (0.272)   
healthlag   -0.280   
   (0.270)   
house    -0.0566***  
    (0.0209)  
houselag    0.0618***  
    (0.0212)  
rent     -0.0760 
     (0.158) 
rentlag     0.0886 
     (0.161) 
Constant -0.467 0.217 -0.169 0.883** -0.503 
 (0.632) (0.336) (0.628) (0.423) (0.632) 
      
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.546 0.566 0.456 0.478 0.473 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 I want to see whether these dynamics remain when controlling for nominal wages and 
lagged nominal wages. Table 15's results show that when controlling for nominal wage, only 
energy has a significant positive effect on consumers' inflation expectation. While food still has a 
positive coefficient, foodlag's coefficient is equivalently negative, the effects largely cancel each 
other out. Furthermore, with nomlag included as a control, nominal wages no longer have a 
significant effect on consumers' inflation expectations.  
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Table 15: Base Model, Lagged Variables Included, Nominal Wage Control 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food 0.422***     
 (0.115)     
foodlag -0.423***     
 (0.123)     
nom 2.248 6.319 7.216 5.433 5.981 
 (3.426) (3.817) (5.007) (4.582) (4.485) 
nomlag -2.138 -6.533* -6.802 -5.252 -5.151 
 (3.367) (3.900) (4.944) (4.585) (4.232) 
rate 0.223 0.184 0.210 0.257 0.212 
 (0.228) (0.229) (0.231) (0.246) (0.234) 
ratelag 0.0547 -0.00239 -0.00168 0.0325 0.0227 
 (0.214) (0.218) (0.216) (0.232) (0.230) 
energy  0.0292***    
  (0.00632)    
energylag  -0.00985    
  (0.00669)    
health   0.425   
   (0.269)   
healthlag   -0.485*   
   (0.263)   
house    -0.0501**  
    (0.0217)  
houselag    0.0463**  
    (0.0222)  
rent     -0.0810 
     (0.141) 
rentlag     0.0252 
     (0.159) 
Constant -0.0268 1.946** -0.0553 -0.0956 0.511 
 (0.842) (0.815) (0.850) (0.562) (0.911) 
      
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.550 0.594 0.525 0.515 0.514 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 Finally, I want to see whether these effects remain when controlling for real wage and 
lagged real wage. Table 16's results show that when controlling for real wage the net effects of 
food and energy prices have the same net effect on consumers' inflation expectations as before 
(when controlling for the lagged values of good variables). With these controls, real wage still 
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generally has a statistically significant negative effect. However, this effect is largely offset by 
the positive coefficients for the lagged value of real. 
Table 16: Base Model, Lagged Variables Included, Real Wage Control 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food 0.408***     
 (0.137)     
foodlag1 -0.397***     
 (0.139)     
real -0.0547* -0.0432 -0.0639* -0.0629* -0.0690** 
 (0.0313) (0.0337) (0.0340) (0.0322) (0.0308) 
reallag1 0.0580* 0.0445 0.0766** 0.0703** 0.0730** 
 (0.0333) (0.0365) (0.0366) (0.0343) (0.0329) 
rate 0.200 0.226 0.209 0.213 0.218 
 (0.236) (0.254) (0.273) (0.263) (0.270) 
ratelag1 0.102 0.0719 0.118 0.0654 0.119 
 (0.228) (0.245) (0.262) (0.257) (0.268) 
energy  0.0209**    
  (0.00918)    
energylag1  -0.00950    
  (0.00923)    
health   0.0585   
   (0.312)   
healthlag1   -0.0385   
   (0.309)   
house    -0.0534***  
    (0.0198)  
houselag1    0.0579***  
    (0.0201)  
rent     -0.0266 
     (0.151) 
rentlag1     0.0379 
     (0.154) 
Constant -1.415 -0.143 -3.839 -1.363 -1.554 
 (2.823) (2.550) (2.995) (3.118) (2.913) 
      
Observations 143 143 143 143 143 
R-squared 0.562 0.573 0.484 0.502 0.498 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  My final test is to see whether these dynamics remain when controlling for broader 
trends in consumers' inflation expectations over the years. For this purpose, I control for time 
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fixed effects in my base model. I begin by adding time fixed effects to my adaptive expectations 
model. The results are in Table 17: 










Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 While I found that consumers' inflation expectations are effected by previously observed 
inflation had a statistically significant positive effect on consumers' inflation expectations, this 
relationship vanishes when controlling for time fixed effects. Similarly, as Table 18 displays, 
price levels largely lose their significance when controlling for time fixed effects, with only 
energy maintains its significance. That being said, energy's coefficient is higher than in my base 
model, which leads to an average effect of a 3.14% increase in consumers' inflation expectations. 















Table 18: Base Model, Time Fixed Effects 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food -0.0267     
 (0.0264)     
rate 0.162*** 0.143*** 0.170*** 0.174*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0498) (0.0560) (0.0563) (0.0521) 
energy  0.0223***    
  (0.00437)    
health   -0.00234   
   (0.0431)   
house    -0.00632  
    (0.00820)  
rent     -0.0242 
     (0.0181) 
Constant 9.502*** 5.523*** 7.137*** 7.677*** 9.205*** 
 (2.280) (0.702) (1.201) (1.108) (1.511) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.949 0.959 0.948 0.948 0.949 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 19: Base Model, Time Fixed Effects, Nominal Wage Control 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food -0.0227     
 (0.0500)     
nom -0.0582 -0.643*** -1.317** -0.251 0.253 
 (0.526) (0.239) (0.578) (0.422) (0.714) 
rate 0.162*** 0.123*** 0.174*** 0.166*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0444) (0.0529) (0.0532) (0.0529) 
energy  0.0255***    
  (0.00384)    
health   0.193**   
   (0.0831)   
house    -0.00307  
    (0.0121)  
rent     -0.0403 
     (0.0451) 
Constant 9.555*** 9.918*** 11.61*** 9.170*** 8.795*** 
 (2.218) (1.684) (2.346) (2.130) (2.092) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.949 0.962 0.951 0.949 0.949 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 20: Base Model, Time Fixed Effects, Real Wage Control 
mich (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
food -0.0270     
 (0.0257)     
real -0.0201 0.0120 -0.0201 -0.0186 -0.0177 
 (0.0175) (0.0145) (0.0174) (0.0183) (0.0180) 
rate 0.151*** 0.147*** 0.158*** 0.163*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0506) (0.0501) (0.0540) (0.0550) (0.0512) 
energy  0.0241***    
  (0.00433)    
health   -0.00790   
   (0.0419)   
house    -0.00536  
    (0.00821)  
rent     -0.0219 
     (0.0186) 
Constant 16.06*** 1.498 13.81** 13.64** 14.76*** 
 (5.870) (4.754) (5.493) (5.536) (5.481) 
      
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.950 0.959 0.949 0.949 0.950 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Section 5: Discussion 
 As stated earlier, this paper has four goals. The first is to see if the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis applies to consumers’ inflation expectations. Friedman argues that people assume that 
inflation will be the same as previously observed inflation, and uses the metric of average 
inflation from the past four quarters to measure expected inflation. When testing this hypothesis 
with consumers’ inflation expectation, I initially find that average observed inflation does have a 
statistically significant positive effect. While Friedman’s theory would suggest a 1% increase in 
consumers’ inflation expectations for every 1% increase in observed inflation, my regressions 
shows a 1.4% increase in consumers’ inflation expectations for every 1% increase in average 
observed inflation. This is not a surprise, as summary statistics show that consumers generally 
expect inflation to be higher than it actually is. That being said, this relationship vanishes when 
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controlling for time fixed effects. This suggests that Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) are 
correct in their assumption that consumers are rationally inattentive and do not rely upon 
aggregate economic data when forming their expectations.    
 This paper’s second goal is to identify which prices have the largest effect on consumers’ 
inflation expectations. While Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2013) find that changes in prices 
from quarter to quarter have a large, significant effect on consumers’ inflation expectations, my 
results find the changes’ effects to be statistically significant but negligible; there is also the 
surprising finding that housedif’s effect is statistically significant but negative. My results 
suggest that price levels, not changes in price, have the largest effect on consumers’ inflation 
expectations, as my base model finds that all good variables have a statistically significant 
positive effect on consumers’ inflation expectations. By comparing these coefficients to good 
variables' mean values, I find that on average the values of food and rent have the largest effect 
on consumers’ inflation expectations. However, when controlling for time fixed effects, only 
energy's coefficient is statistically significant. This is likely due to the fact that the price of 
energy, particularly oil, can be extremely volatile; this is demonstrated by the extreme maximum 
and minimum values of energydif, as well as its high standard deviation, listed in my summary 
statistics. As energy prices can fluctuate, it makes sense that consumers' inflation expectations 
would be sensitive to these changes; this finding supports Coibion and Gorodnichenko's (2013) 
finding that consumers' inflation expectations are extraordinarily sensitive to the price of oil, as I 
find an average increase of 3.14% in consumers’ inflation expectations based on energy’s level 
 This paper’s third goal is to see if price levels still have a significant effect on consumers’ 
inflation expectations when controlling for wages. My fixed effects model finds that energy's 
coefficient is still significant when controlling for both nominal and real wages. This paper’s 
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final goal is to see if the Federal Reserve can use monetary policy to affect consumers’ inflation 
expectations. My base and fixed effects models find that the federal funds rate, while statistically 
significant, has a positive effect. This suggests that consumers are either not rational actors, 
largely ignorant of the effects of monetary policy, or both. This is backed up by the fact that 
consumers’ inflation expectations are unaffected by changes in the federal funds rate, as well as 
all measures of inflation targeting. These findings suggest that the Federal Reserve is unable to 
curb consumers’ inflation expectations using monetary policy as they would hope.  
Section 6: Conclusion 
 My paper makes two important contributions to the literature. Firstly, it confirms that 
consumers are rationally inattentive, as their expectations are insensitive to observed inflation 
and monetary policy when controlling for time fixed effects. Secondly, it supports Coibion and 
Gorodnichenko's (2013) findings, as I find that the price of energy has a large significant effect 
on consumers' inflation expectations, with an average 3.14% increase in consumers' inflation 
expectations. I hypothesize that this increased sensitivity to energy prices is due to these goods' 
volatility. As much of this volatility is a consequence of the United States' reliance on importing 
oil from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), this finding suggests that 
increased energy independence would help to anchor consumers' inflation expectations. The 
federal government has a large number of options for approaching this goal. One immediate 
pathway could be the loosening of regulations on tapping America's own oil and natural gas 
reserves; such actions are likely under the Trump Administration. But if the United States is to 
avoid the negative environmental externalities of these expansions, policymakers should also 
consider investing in the expansion of renewable energy sources such as solar power and wind. 
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That being said, such expansions would be less likely to have the immediate effect on 
consumers' inflation expectations.  
  There are a number of ways in which future researchers can expand on my work. The 
first step would be to employ a VAR model to capture potentially unobserved dynamic 
relationships. However, this is a first step. A researcher with enough resources should expand 
upon my findings with their own original work at the individual level. I would recommend an 
experiment where participants are surveyed on their inflation expectations every month, but are 
gradually educated on basic monetary policy; they would also be required to take in a specific 
regiment of economic news. The purpose of this experiment would be to see if the addition of 
low levels of education on monetary policy can help anchor consumers’ expectations the way the 
Federal Reserve desires to. Finally, I believe it would be worthwhile to study the effects of 
changes in the rhetoric of politicians and popular news personalities on consumers' inflation 
expectations. As my paper suggests that consumers are largely irrational, such a study could help 
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